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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROCKET :l\IINING CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and
PIONEER CARISSA GOLD
MINES, INC., a Wyoming
corpora ti on,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

RULAN J. GILL, LENORE M.
GILL, RAY GILL, ANGELO M.
HILLIS, HERl\iIAN F. LUND,
and T. W. HILLIS,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12174

Brief of Defendants-Respondents

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs-Appellants brought this action
against Defendants-Respondents to determine whether
or not the Defendants-Respondents had wrongfully
terminated a public offering of Rocket Mining Corporation; whether Defendants-Respondents had wrong1

fully distributed corporate assets to themselves and
were liable for damages proximately arising therefrom;
and whether Defendants-Respondents distributed to
themselves and others $130,000 received from the sale
of certain claims and were liable to Plaintiffs-Appellants for said sum.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court with legal issues
being disposed of in written memoranda submitted by
counsel for the parties to the court. The District Court
granted judgment for the Defendants-Respondents and
against the Plaintiffs-Appellants, no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs-Appellants have taken this appeal
and have requested the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah to reverse the judgment of the lower court and
to direct entry of judgment for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts includes some 17
assertions of fact upon which appellants rely. Most of
these assertions are from "The Minute Book" maintained by Rocket Mining Company and respondents
have no quarrel with the entries from this book where
2

properly quoted. There are, however, certain assertions
which are not accurate. Some examples of these are
as follows:
(a) Paragraph 1 asserts that Lenore Gill and T.
W. Billis were directors for "some time during the
period when defendants were operating Rocket." It is
unknown what "some time" is supposed to be but it
must be pointed out that Lenore Gill first became a
director in July of 1956, and that Tom Billis was not
an officer or director until June 1957. Furthermore,
A. M. Billis was an officer and director but briefly in
late 1956 and for a short time in 1958 and Herman
Lund was a director of the company from only its initiation in July of 1955 to N
of 1955.
(b) Paragraph 4 asserts the respondents sold their
own stock subsequent to stopping the public offering.
Neither Lenore Gill nor Ray Gill ever sold any stock
and some of the stock sold by some of the other respondents was stock which they purchased as trading
stock on the open market and not just stock acquired
from the corporation in the offering.
( c) Paragraph 9 indicates that salaries were paid
totaling $17,400. The true sum was $14,500 with $7,000
paid to A. M. Billis and $7,500 to R. J. Gill. Such
sums are not, however, involved in such proceeding,
having been heretofore repaid.
( d) Paragraph 13 implies that there was a sale of
assets to Ray Cram which is incorrect, there only being
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a sale of stock by A. M. Billis and R. J. Gill which
would not require a corporate meeting.
( e) Paragraph 14 reports on the suit in federal
court between Pioneer Carissa and Rocket. This suit
also asserted claims for equipment missing and disposed
of, and a settlement thereof resolved and satisfied such
claims. The present defendants were not involved in this
suit directly or indirectly, having disposed of all their
interests in Rocket sometime before .

.

(f) Paragraph 15 asserts that when the assets,
books, and records of Rocket were turned over to Pioneer as a result of the federal judgment, they were not
complete and that the individual respondents may have
engaged in unauthorized and unlawful acts causing
assets to be lost or depleted. There was no evidence that
the books and records of Rocket were not properly maintained and complete while any of the respondents were
involved in the Rocket affairs, and the evidence and facts
were to the contrary. The remainder of the paragraph
is, of course, nothing but a conclusion without evidentiary support.
Finally, it must be noted that nowhere in the appellants' Statement of Facts is there any mention of the undisputed testimony of Leland B. Tanner and Byron
Watts. These two responsible, disinterested witnesses
destroyed appellants' contentions. Mr. Tanner testified
that he was a broker involved in the Rocket underwriting
and that the stock could not be sold because of market
conditions at the time and the underwriting was there-
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fore terminated in January of 1956. Mr. "\Vatts testified
that he was the accountant for Rocket Mining Corporation during the years 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1958, that
the books and records of the corporation were kept in a
proper manner; and that the expenditures made to defendants R. J. Gill, A. 1\11. Billis, and Herman Lund in
January of 1958 were the repayment by the corporation
of proper corporate obligations represented by promissory notes for loans made to the company without interest or advances made on behalf of the corporation, all of
which had been properly documented and established to
his satisfaction.
Because the appellants chose only to set forth certain facts in their Brief which were neither complete nor
entirely accurate, it is deemed necessary to set forth an
addtional statement of facts. This statement will merely
review the significant history of Rocket Mining Company and the parties' relationship therewith as established by the records of the corporation and the undisputed testimony of witnesses during the trial:
Rocket Mining Corporation was organized in the
summer of 1955 and a registration made of its stock for
public sale with both the Securties Commission of the
State of Utah and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The federal registration was pursuant to a regulation A exemption which authorized the
sale of stock in the amount of not more than $300,000.
Only $75,000 was registered to be sold in the State of
Utah (Ex. P-1 and P-6).

5

The initial offering and prospectus dated in August
of 1955 attempted to sell the stock for 5 cents per share.
Mid-America Brokerage, operated by B. Leland Tanner, was the underwriter. Because the stock could not be
sold, the price per share was reduced in November of
1955 to one cent per share and the offering circular modified to this extent. In December of 1955 Mr. Tanner advied R. J. Gill, President of Rocket Mining, that he
could not sell the stock and that the offering should
therefore be terminated or a new broker found who
better success in selling the shares (Ex. P-3;
might
R. 520-21).
Empire Securities, another Salt Lake City brokerage firm, also attempted to sell the offering but without
success. The offering was withdrawn by the company on
January 6, 1956. Three million shares of stock had been
sold for $30,000 with Rocket receiving some $26,000
after the payment of the brokerage commission. The
officers of the company and their friends and relatives
had purchased most of the stock (Ex. P-8; R. 380, 522,
528). The offering was terminated because of the inability to sell the shares during the 4 to 5 month period
that sales were attempted and also because the corporation had obtained the assignment of a lease on what appeared to be a valuable uranium property known as
"Vanadium King No. I'' in the Temple Mountain Area
of Utah. The company felt that this property would provide an immediate source of income and sufficient working capital to conduct the company's future operations
(R. 182).
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About May 1, 1956, the corporation was forced to
terminate its mining operations on the Vanadium King
No. 1 property because of a defect in the lease that had
been acquired by the company (Ex. P-2, minutes of
May 1, 1956; Ex. D-33). An active market for the stock
of the company began to develop in March of 1956 and
certain sales of stock were made by R. J. Gill and A. M.
Billis of stock that had been purchased by them from the
public offering. In addition to the registered shares that
they had purchased in the underwriting, these two men
owned substantial unregistered shares which they had
obtained from the company in its organizational period
in exchange for mining properties. All of this stock, however, that was owned by these two men was escrowed
with the Utah Securities Commission (Ex. P-4).
R. J. Gill was an organizer of the Rocket Mining Company and its president and a director from
the date of incorporation until the middle of the year
1958 (Ex. P-2). A. M. Hillis was active in the organization of the company but was neither an officer nor director of the company until the late spring of 1958 except
for a brief period of several weeks in the late fall of 1956
when he was secretary of the company (Ex. P-2, minutes of meetings of November 7 and December 14, 1956;
R. 542). Ray Gill, the father of R. J. Gill, was a director
of the company during most of the time in question but
did not buy or sell any of the stock that had been offered
to the public. Lenore Gill, the wife of R. J. Gill, became
a member of the Board of Directors on July 17, 1956,
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and continued to act in that capacity until the middle of
1958. She also neither bought nor sold any of the socalled public stock. Herman Lund was a director of the
company at the time of its incorporation but resigned this
post in November of 1955. Thereafter his only connection with the company was as a stockholder and as a
lender of certain funds. T. W. Billis, the brother of A.
M. Billis, first became associated with the company in
June of 1957 when he was elected to the Board. He resigned from the Board on February 15, 1958 (Ex. P-2).
Because of the limited amount of working capital
that had been obtained by the company through the public offering, it became necessary for the company to
borrow funds with which to operate. Certain loans were
made to the corporation without interest by the president, R. J. Gill, with the approval of the Board of Directors. These loans were reflected both in the company
minutes and by promissory notes and finally totaled the
sum of $24,694.83 (Ex. P-2, P-8, P-11). These loans by
the president to the corporation and the corporation's
obligation to him for such sums were known to the plaintiff Pioneer Carissa prior to its entering into a sales
agreement with Rocket Mining Company in the fall of
1956 (Ex. D-24).
Herman Lund and A. M. Billis loaned Rocket
some $48,330 which was obtained from the sale of some
of their free trading Rocket Mining stock. This stock
was sold through an escrow account in the name of Herman Lund set up with the Empire Securities Company
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in order to obtain funds to purchase a mill in South Pass,
Wyoming, from the plaintiff Pioneer Carissa. Of this
sum $45,000 was paid to Pioneer Carissa by Rocket as
part of the purchase price of the mill and the remaining
balance was used to repay Empire Securities for the advance on this sum on Rocket's behalf to Gallagher Engineering Company for services rendered by Gallagher
m engineering studies performed on the mill (Ex. P-2
and P-8; R. 371, 535 and 557).
During the years 1956 and 1957 Mr. Billis and Mr.
Gill advanced substantial amounts for expenses incurred
on behalf of the corporation. All of these advances were
reported to the Board of Directors and reflected in the
minutes of the Board. They were also submitted to the
company accountant, l\:Ir. Byron "\Vatts, who required
detailed information and supporting vouchers before he
would enter the obligations in the corporate records. Mr.
Billis made advances in the sum of $4,271.95 and Mr.
Gill, in the sum of $10,683.80 (Ex. P-2 and P-8; R. 531
and 534). These amounts were substantiated by the accountant, set forth in the ledger book, and approved by
the Board of Directors in the corporate minutes.
The mill at South Pass, Wyoming, was purchased
in October of 1956 from the plaintiff, Pioneer Carissa
Gold Mines, by Rocket Mining for the sum of $60,000
plus 2 million shares of Rocket stock which were contributed without charge by Rocket's president, R. J.
Gill (Ex. P-2 and P-8; R. 535). The plaintiff, Pioneer
Carissa, was in severe financial straits at the time of sale

9

and needed the money in order to pay off pressing financial obligations. About the time of the purchase of
the mill, A. M. Hillis and R. J. Gill acquired a leasehold
interest in some claims located in the Gas Hills Mining
District of Wyoming known as the ''Rim Group." These
claims were then given over to Rocket Mining Company
by Gill and Hillis for no consideration on Rocket's part.
A drilling obligation, however, had been incurred in obtaining this leasehold interest and because Rocket lacked
the funds needed to perform this required drilling, an
agreement was entered into with the Uranium Research
and Development Company for this company to drill the
property for an interest in the leasehold. This drilling
successfully blocked out a substantial body of ore (R.
551, 552 and 555).
Numerous efforts were made by the corporate officers to obtain financing for Rocket in order to enable
it to develop and mine the ore body and also to convert
the Pioneer Carissa mill so that it could be used to mill
the ores and thus provide the corporation with an integrated operation. R. J. Gill took a number of trips to the
east in an effort to obtain a long-form underwriting of
Rocket stock. An underwriting agreement was finally
reached which would require all of the holders of unregistered stock of Rocket Mining Company to place
such stock in escrow for the term of the underwriting.
The plaintiff, Pioneer Carissa Corporation, was a substantial stockholders by reason of the stock it had received from R. J. Gill as part of the purchase price of
the mill. It ref used to agree to the escrow agreement and
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this underwriting opportunity was thereby lost (Ex. D21; R. 381, 552-53).
When all efforts to obtain the necessary funds for
Rocket to contribute its required share for the development of the Rim Group property failed, it was concluded
by the officers that they would have to sell the property
to their joint venturer in order that Rocket's interest was
not lost. Such a sale was negotiated and effected in January of 1958 for the sum of $130,000 (R. 555-56). This
money was used to pay all outstanding corporate obligations except a small amount of money owing to Pioneer
Carissa which was not paid because of plaintiff's failure
to complete its sales agreement with Rocket. Mr. Gill,
Mr. Billis, and Mr. Lund received the monies owing t<!
them for the loans and advances that have been described
hereinabove and as reflected in the corporate minutes
and financial records. After these and the other corporate obligations were paid, there remained the sum 6f
$4,661.66 in the corporate account (Ex. P-2 and P-8;
R. 535-36, 557).
After the sale of the Rim Group of claims in J anuary of 1958, the corporate officers continued to maintain the remaining corporate property except certain of
the mining claims on which they had been unable to locate any ore. They performed the required assessment
work on the Butts claims and the Mercury mine and also
continued in their efforts to develop other valuable interests in the Gas Hills Mining District in Wyoming.
They maintained a watchman at the mill in South Pass
11

and kept it locked at all times in order to conserve the
equipment and fixtures located therein. In the middle of
the year 1958, A. M. Billis and R. J. Gill who had been
devoting their full time and best efforts on behalf of the
company for the past several years concluded that it was
impossible for them to obtain the cooperation of the Pioneer Carissa group in the development of the Rocket interests and therefore sold their stock interests to a lVIr.
Roy Cram and turned over the corporate records to him
(Ex. P-2, minutes of May 14, 1958; R. 559, 561-64).
Prior to selling their interests to Mr. Cram, the officers
prepared and caused to be distributed to all stockholders
a stockholders' report dated June 26, 1958 (Ex. P-6;

R. 566).

The only issues to be resolved by the lower court
were stipulated by the parties to be the following:
I. Whether defendants wrongfully terminated the

public offering of Rocket stock and are therefore liable
to the plaintiffs for damages caused thereby.
2. Whether defendants unlawfully distributed cor-

porate assets to themselves and others and are liable for
all damages proximately arising therefrom.

3. Whether defendants unlawfully distributed to
themselves and others the $130,000 received from the

sale of the Rim Group of claims and are therefore liable
for said sum.

While appellants acknowledge on page 7 of their
Brief that the only issues were stipulated to by the par-
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ties and were the three listed above, they thereafter present argument under three headings which differ substantially from the issues stipulated. The following argument will be directed to the stipulated issues rather
than to the new propositions now urged by appellants in
their Brief:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS DID NOT WRONGFULLY
TER.MINATE THE PUBLIC OFFERING OF
ROCKET STOCK AND THUS ARE NOT LIABLE TO APPELLANTS FOR ANY DAMAGES CAUSED THEREBY.
While appellants stipulated that their first claim
was that respondents had wrongfully terminated the
public offering, they now argue that the offering "had
not actually or officially been terminated" when they
sold certain shares of stock. This change of position was
undoubtedly required by reason of the testimony of Mr.
B. Leland Tanner together with the testimony of defendants A. M. Billis and R. J. Gill. This uncontroverted testimony established that stock market conditions in the fall of 1955 made it almost impossible to sell
any shares of uranium stock and that the issue, therefore, was closed in January of 1956 with only some 3
million shares sold at l cent.
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Appellants' new position that the offering had not
been terminated is based solely upon a letter to Rocket
from the SEC dated April 2, 1956 (Ex. P-10). This
letter acknowledged an "indication in our files that no
securities are presently being offered" but requested that
a withdrawal notification be filed. A prompt response
from Rocket to Mr. Milton J. Blake of the SEC dated
April 4, 1956, established that "The public offering was
closed· January 6, 1956, at which time the 3 million
shares offered to the public and now trading had been
purchased." (Ex. P-1.) The SEC form 2-A final report
dated February 27, 1956, reports that no other shares are
being offered and describes the use which had been
made of the proceeds received by the company from the
sale of the 3 million shares (Ex. P-1). It thus was conclusively established, by written documents as well as
sworn testimony, that the offering was terminated in
January, 1956, and that the reasons for the termination
were not unlawful or otherwise improper as originally
asserted by the plaintiff.
Appellants' new position that respondents sold stock
while the offering was still open and therefore incurred
some liability to the corporation is likewise without
merit. Appellants conclude their Point II by urging:
It is submitted that the stock transactions of
defendants, at least during the offering period,
should be set aside and defendants be held liable
for the amounts allegedly loaned to the corporation and repaid to them.

There was no evidence whatsoever that the corporation
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was in anyway damaged as a result of receiving noninterest bearing loans from the respondents or because
additional equity capital was not obtained in the underwriting. While one might speculate that additional
equity capital could have been helpful, there is no indication of how much might have been obtained, what it
could have been used for, or how the corporation was
damaged by reason of not having it available.
The fact that Rocket stock some two months foIIowing the termination of the offering began trading for
amounts exceeding the offering price because of production on the Temple Mountain property or other promising developments in the corporation is no indication that
the corporation or any of its stockholders were in any
way damaged by termination of the offering or any actions of these respondents. AH Rocket stockholders then
had the same opportunity to seII their stock and realize
profits if they so desired. If there was any advantage in
the termination of the stock sale by reason of market
conditions that may have resulted, such advantage was
shared by aII of the company,s stockholders.
Appellants, argument is based apparently on the
premise that equity capital, that is the funds obtained
from the sale of the corporation,s stock, is owned by the
corporation or has a greater value to a corporation than
borrowed funds. Equity capital belongs to 'the stockholders, not the corporation. 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 208 at 736 ( 1965.) It is true a company needs
equity capital. This is because it usuaily cannot obtain
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funds to operate in the form of loans without having a
sufficient amount of equity. Actually, low interest-bearing debts are cheaper and in some ways more beneficial
to a company than equity capital. The primary difference between financing corporation activities with debt
rather than equity is that the risk of loss is placed on the
lenders rather than the stockholders. The company is not
necessarily prejudiced by such means of financing.
A clear defense to any claim premised on the termination of the public offering in January of 1956 or
the sale by any of the defendants of stock in the spring
of that year is the statute of limitations. This action was
initially filed on September 21, 1961, but then contained
only two causes of action. The first cause of action asserted that the defendants had conspired to sell and had
sold corporate assets without authority to the corporation's damage of $250,000 and in addition had unlawfully withdrawn from the corporation $28,000. This
claim demanded an accounting and· exemplary damages.
The second cause of action merely asserted that the
funds wrongfully obtained had been used to fund the
Super Tire Market and sought to trace such funds.
The first claim concerning the stock offering in
1955 was asserted on July 29, 1962, when an amended
complaint was filed. Count II in such amended complaint contended that the offering had been improperly
terminated and the facts concealed until after April of
1960.

Section 78-12-27 Utah Code Ann. (1953} provides
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that the time within which action must be brought
against corporation officers for misfeasance in the performance of duties is "3 years, after discovery by the
aggrieved party, of the facts upon which ... the liability
accrued." As is indicated above, notice of the offering
termination was set forth in correspondence with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Utah Securities
Commission, as well as in stockholder reports.
Pioneer Carissa's minutes of October 31, 1956, indicate that R. J. Gill had advised Pioneer Carissa's officers about Rocket and informed them that there had been
only 3 million shares sold to the general public. Rocket's
lack of capital was likewise divulged to Pioneer Carissa
according to its minutes of September 25, 1956, which
indicate George Colemere asked Rocket for $5,000 for
an option and was advised by Gill and Hillis that they
would have to obtain the $5,000 for Rocket by encumbering their homes. Further, all books and records of the
corporation reflecting all of the transactions complained
of were turned over to Roy Cram in the summer of 1958.
The facts of the termination of the stock offering were
thus known for over six years before any claim was made
and about four years after Respondents sold all interest
in the company. On the other hand, even if appellants
now claim that they did not have actual knowledge of
the termination, it can hardly be doubted that appellants
had sufficient information which if reasonably considered and pursued would have led appellants to a full
understanding of the facts. Under Statutes of Limitation
requiring knowledge of the facts before the Statute be-
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gins to run, this type of knowledge has been held sufficient. Loring v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 802,
155 So. 231.
Finally, it must be pointed out that while appellants
generally assert that all respondents were involved in the
offering, termination, and the sale of stock thereafter,
this is not the case. Respondent Rulan J. Gill as president was involved in the stock offering and did sell some
stock of the corporation during the period involved. His
wife Lenore M. Gill, however, was not then an officer
and never sold any stock at any time nor did his father
Ray Gill. Angelo M. Hillis did sell stock but during this
period was neither an officer nor a director of the company. T. W. Hillis was not involved in any way with the
company during this time and was therefore dismissed
from this claim by the trial court. Herman Lund began
as a director of the company but resigned from this position in November of 1955 and thereafter had no connection with the company except as a stockholder and
lender.
Appellants have failed to produce any proof that
the respondents or any of them have any obligation to
Rocket Mining Company as a result of the public offering of Rocket stock or its termination or because of any
sales of Rocket stock that they may have made.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS DID NOT UNLAWFULLY
DISTRIBUTE CORPORATE ASSETS TO
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THEMSELVES AND OTHERS AND ARE
THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES ON SUCH ACCOUNT.
The stipulated issue between the parties was
"Whether defendants wrongfully distributed corporate
assets to themselves and others and are liable for all damages proximately arising therefrom." This issue became
unsatisfactory to the appellants after the evidence was
presented and there was no proof elicited in support of
such charge and therefore plaintiffs now come up with
the following new issue: "Because defendants either sold
or allowed to be sold, lost or stolen, assets of Rocket and
then improperly sold their stock and turned over control
of Rocket to a person for a nominal price when they
knew the assets of Rocket were of much greater value,
they in effect abandoned the corporation and violated
their fiduciary duty to the stockholders and are therefore liable for the amount of loss shown on the balance
sheet of Nelson and Watts."
There was no evidence presented by appellants that
any assets of Rocket were lost or stolen during the time
respondents were involved with the affairs of Rocket
Mining Company. The only assets then sold were minimal and reflected in the minutes and financial records
of the company and the proceeds thereof accounted for
by the officers. What respondents Gill and Billis sold
their stock for to Roy Cram is of no concern to the corporation and creates no liability on their part to the corporation. The fact is undisputed that such a sale did take
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place in 1958 and that Mr. Cram thereafter took over
the operations of the company and the possession of the
corporate assets. There is no legal requirement which
requires a shareholders' meeting to authorize the sale of
a stockholders' individually owned stock to a third party.

The two facts argued by appellants in support of
this new charge were that respondents' credibility is in
question because they paid themselves a one-year salary
in violation of their agreement with the Utah Securities
Comnlission and that Walter Pessetto did not attend the ,
corporate board meetings as reflected in the minutes but
merely signed the minutes after they had been prepared.
Respondents R. J. Gill and A. M. Hillis worked for a
period in excess of two years full time on the affairs of
Rocket Mining Company with no compensation. After
they had obtained for the company properties, drilled
out valuable ore thereon, and sold such ore for a substantial consideration, they considered that they had produced profits for the company and paid themselves a
nominal one-year salary which had been authorized by
the Board over a year before. (Ex. P-2, minutes of December 14, 1956). It has now been determined that such
payment was precluded by the agreement with the Utah
Securities Commission and this money repaid to the appellants. How this establishes further liability is un·
known. The fact that one of the directors did not attend
the meetings and merely signed the minutes after they
had been prepared also does not prove any monetary
loss to the corporation, nor any bad faith on 'the part of
1

1

1
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respondents. Such conduct, not unusual in corporate affairs, does not alone create any liability.
Because there are no assets missing as a result of
any improper conduct on the part of the respondents,
there is no basis for this claim. This is established by the
following facts which refute this groundless charge:
(a) There was no requirement for stockholder approval or corporate approval before shareholders R. J.
Gill and A. M. Billis could sell their individually owned
stock to Roy Cram or anyone else. This was in no way a
transfer of corporate assets, which transfer requires
shareholder approval, since corporate assets belong to
the corporation and not the shareholders. Rocket still
had title to those assets after sale by respondents. Therefore, no transfer requiring shareholder approval had
taken place.
(b) The stock sold by R. J. Gill and A. M. Billis
was not "free trading" stock and was escrowed with the
Utah Securities Commission. Although representing a
controlling position, it was of limited value by reason of
this fact and even more because Gill and Billis had been
totally frustrated in their efforts to develop Rocket
Mining and its affairs by Pioneer Carissa through the
intransigence of its president, George Colemere.
( c) The N elson-'Vatts accounting and the other
corporate records do not indicate any loss of corporate
assets but on the contrary show that the only property
that was not owned and possessed by Rocke't when Gill

21

and Hillis sold their stock interest in Rocket to Cram and
turned the corporate records over to him were the
Houghton claims which had been dropped as nonproductive and a few items of equipment that had been sold
and were accounted for in the minutes and in the corporate financial records. Further, this report did not
purport to reflect market values of corporate assets (R.
534).

(d) The testimony of R. J. Gill and A. M. Hillis
and the minutes of Rocket establish that they did not
abandon. the company after receiving payment of their '
loans and advances. The Stockholder Report of June
1958 also reflects their continuing efforts on behalf of
the company up to the time of their stock sale to Cram.
( e) George Colemere's testimony was inconsistent,
discredited, and unworthy of belief. He acknowledged
that no inventory had been made of the Pioneer Carissa
mill at the time of the sale to Rocket and that the first
inventory made thereafter was not made until 1960 following the judgment in the federal court which restored
the mill property to Carissa (R. 423, 427). Three different inventories were produced and acknowledged by
Mr. Colemere. These inventories established that much
of the equipment claimed lost by Rocket was not in the
mill or otherwise possessed by Carissa at the time Rocket
took possession (Ex. P-16; D-17; D-30; D-31).
(f) The items of equipment that admittedly were
sold by Roy Cram on behalf of Rocket during the time
that he was responsible for the corporate affairs are not
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the responsibility of these respondents and further, any
claims involving such equipment were resolved in the
lawsuit in federal court between Pioneer Carissa and
Rocket and the settlement agreed to by Roy Cram on
behalf of Rocket.
(g) Rocket, during the time any of the respondents
were involved in its affairs, kept the mill at South Pass
locked and watched by a watchman, and George Colemere acknowledged this and admitted he did not know
who was supposed to have taken the equipment claimed
by him to be missing ( R. 442, 559) .

POINT III
RESPONDENTS DID NOT UNLAWFULLY
DISTRIBUTE TO THEMSELVES THE $130,ooo RECEIVED
THE SALE OF THE
RIM GROUP OF CLAIMS AND THEREFORE
HA VE NO LIABILITY FOR SAID SUM OR
ANY PART THEREOF.
The admitted distribution of the $130,000 received
from the sale of the Rim Group was made to bona fide
creditors of Rocket and fully reflected in the minutes of
the corporation as follows:
R. J. Gill ----------------------------------------------$24,694.93

R. J. Gill ----------------------------------------------

10,683.80

A. M. Billis ---------------------------------·--···--- 4,271.95
Smith-Nicholas Law Firm -----·------·--· 4,650.00
Smith-Nicholas Law Firm ·-·--·----·----· 15,596.76
A. M. Billis ·-----------·-------------------------·--· 24,II5.00
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Herman F. Lund -------------------------------- 24,115.00
R. J. Gillis ------------------------------------------ 7,225.50
A. M. Hillis ---------------------------------------- 6,745.50
Director of Internal Revenue ------------ 3,240.00
Rocket :Mining Corporation -------------- 4,661.66
It was the undisputed evidence of Byron Watts, the
independent accountant who kept the corporate books,
as well as of the respondents R. J. Gill and A. M. Hillis
that all of these payments were payments of valid corporate o.bligations, reflected by promissory notes except
the legal fees, taxes, and salary payments. There was no
evidence that the payments to the law firm were improper or were for anything other than services rendered
to the corporation.

The two payments of $24,115 each to A. M. Hillis
and Herman F. Lund were in repayment of the money
loaned to the company which was paid to Pioneer Carissa as part of the purchase price for the mill pursuant
to the minutes and financial records .of the corporation,
the escrow established with the Empire Securities Corporation, and the promissory notes issued to the recipienls by the company. R. J. Gill loaned Rocket certain
sums which were expended for company purposes. These
loans were fully reflected in the minutes and financial
records of the corporation and evidenced by promissory
notes which were non-interest bearing. Such loans to·
taled $24,694.93 as shown by the Certificate of Examina·
tion of July 5, 1957 (Ex. P-11; R. 531).
The sum of $10,683.80 received by Mr. Gill and the
amount of $4,271.95 received by Mr. Hillis were for
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sums advanced or expenses incurred by them on behalf
of the company for company purposes. These were also
authorized by the board and reflected in the financial
records and minutes. Mr. Watts testified that he required proof in the form of checks, receipts or other
vouchers in support of all these expenditures before they
were accepted and entered in the company financial
records ( R. 530) . There was no evidence disputing the
facts that these loans were made and that these sums
were actually advanced and thus proper obligations of
the company.
Appellants contend that because there was not a
disinterested quorum of directors present at the meeting
which authorized the distribution of the $130,000, such
distribution was unlawful and respondents liable for the
amounts so disbursed. The directors involved in the
meeting were R. J. Gill, Lenore Gill, Ray Gill, and T.
W. Billis. The only one of the group that received any.
funds from the distribution was R. J. Gill. Admittedly,
the articles had prior to this meeting been amended to
provide for a board of seven directors. However, only
four directors had been elected at the last stockholders'
meeting, leaving three more to be appointed by the fourman board. No appointments had been made by the
board, although the minutes reflect that several appointment attempts had been made (Ex. P-2, minutes of October 18 and December 14, 1956).
Based upon the foregoing facts, appellants contend
that a majority of seven rather than four was required to
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constitute a quorum of the Board of Directors. They
argue that since R. J. Gill was an interested party to the
vote he could not be counted in determining the existence
of the quorum. That left only three directors, one short
of the needed majority, and the action taken by the
board was therefore illegal. There is one glaring defect
with this line of reasoning, however. Appellants have
failed to grasp the significance of certain critical facts
which readily distinguish this case from those cited in
appellants' brief. While some authorities cited by appellants do indicate that the number necessary for a quorum
of the board is based upon the total number of board
members including "vacancies" a close examination of
those authorities reveals that the boards of directors
there dealt with were boards that had been fully constituted in which subsequent vacancies occurred as a result
of death, resignation or discharge of duly constituted
and acting directors. The very authority relied upon
most heavily by appellants, in discussing whether or not
a newly created and unfilled directoriship constituted a
"vacancy" states: [T)he construction most favored by
the courts is to view a 'vacancy' as denoting a previous
incumbency." 19 .Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations §1087
(1965). The facts of this case clearly place it outside the
rule contended for by appellants. The correct rule is succinctly stated in 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations
§421 at 276 (Rev. vol. 1969) as follows:
Moreover, newly created directorships which
are unfilled cannot be counted in determining
the number necessary to constitute a quorum of
the Board of Directors.
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There can be little doubt that the above rule is
the appropriate rule for the state of Utah. Section 1610-38 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1962) the section
of our corporation laws dealing with quorum requirements for Boards of Directors, is identical with Section
37 of the Model Business Corporation Act. The notes
and comments to said section 37 distinguish between
vacancies and newly created and unfilled directorships.
I Model Business Corporation Act Ann., § 37 i-13.01
(3) and ( 4) ( 1960) . Two cases are cited therein with
approval for the proposition that newly created and
unfilled directorships are not to be considered in determining the requisite number necessary to form a quorum.
The first case cited was that of Robertson v. Hartmen, 6 Cal. 2d 408, 57 P.2d 1310 ( 1936). In this case
the corporation was organized in May of 1926 with
the articles providing for a board of five directors. In
June of 1926 a special stockholders meeting increased
the number of directors from five to nine but no action
was taken to increase the number of directors. In 1928
three directors, clearly short of a quorum if nine is considered the appropriate board size but a proper quorum
if the board consisted of five members, held a meeting
at which they authorized the execution of notes and
trust deeds on certain corporate property. Plaintiff
contended the action taken by the three directors was
unauthorized and of no effect because they did not constitute a quorum. The appellate court rejected that
contention and said at 57 P.2d, page 1311:
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We are, however, unable to find any support
for the position taken by the plaintiff or for the
conclusion of the trial court. The board of five
directors named in the articles of incorporation
and elected at the first annual meeting of the
stockholders constituted, with the one exception
noted, the same board which on l\<1ay 31, 1928,
acted on the matter of the corporation's indebtedness to the contracting company. There does
not appear to have been any other meeting of
the stockholders at which directors were elected
held prior to that date. Those directors were
duly elected to act as such and constituted the
proper board of directors until the election and
qualification of their successors.
· The second case cited was that of Belle Isle Corp.
v. M acB ean, 30 Del. Ch. 373, 61 A.2d 699 ( 1948) . This
was an action to cancel the issuance of certain shares of
stock. The original articles of incorporation had provided for a Board of Directors consisting of seven members. The bylaws were subsequently amended providing
for a board of 10 directors but the three newly created
directorships had never been filled. At a meeting of the
board after the amendment to the bylaws providing
for the increase in the Board of Directaors, four disinterested directors at said meeting approved the stock
transaction. It was claimed that the issuance of the
stock was invalid because it had not been approved at
a board meeting attended by the requisite number to
form a quorum under the new bylaws. The court expressly rejected that contention and held at 61 A.2d
page 703 as follows:
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I, therefore, conclude that the newly created
directorships could not be counted . . . in determining the number necessary to constitute a
quorum of the Board of Directors . . . .
The foregoing authorities clearly establish that the
four directors continue to act as the board of Rocket
even though seven directors were then provided for
but not elected and that a majority of the four directors
would properly constitute a quorum and could act for
the company. Even if seven is deemed required, four
would constitute a quorum and a majority of such four
could act. Thus, excluding the vote of R. J. Gill as
an interested party, does not affect the validity of the
board action. On the other hand, even if this Court
should find that a proper quorum was not present at
the meeting which authorized the distribution of the
$130,000, appellants have still demonstrated no right
to the return of said funds.

It should be remembered that the authorization of
the board to accept loans from its president and to repay
Mr. Gill and Mr. Billis for their expenses incurred for
the company and for sums advanced on its behalf was
given and such actions approved by the board before it
was increased to seven in number. The law is clear that
once such obligations have been properly incurred
they may be treated as any other obligation of the
corporation and board approval is not necessary before
such obligation can be repaid. In Singer v. Salt Lake
City Copper Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024, trust
deeds were given by a corporation when it was insolvent
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to secure a loan to the company by certain directors.
This Cour't held that the fact that a director who furnished some of the money improperly voted as one of
the quorum did not make the trust deed void because
the loan had been previously authorized. The court
stated at 53 P. page 1027:
Nor would this trust deed be void . . . even if
it were conceded that the plaintiff, being the director who furnished a portion of the money,
improperly voted, as one of the quorum, at the
. . . meeting where the same loan was again
authorized, because an examination of the minutes of [an earlier meeting] shows that the power
then and there conferred on the committee to
negotiate the loan was full and complete, and
hence there was no necessity for any further
authorization at the subsequent meeting.
Generally, the president of other management officer
of the corporation is given general powers to conduct
every day business of the corporation including pay·
ment of valid corporate debts without board approval.
This general rule is stated in 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1186 ( 1965) as follows:

A president of the corporation may be expressly
authorized or have authority by virtue of being
entrusted generally with the management of the
business to pay corporate debts or claims against ,
it.

This same principle was followed in Wood v. McCutcheon, 7 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1939), when it quoted the fol·
lowing language with approval from Restat,ement
of Agency § 73:
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Unless otherwise agreed, authority to manage
a business includes authority ... to receive payment of sums due the principal and to pay debts
due from the principal arising out of the business enterprise.
R. J. Gill, the president of Rocket, was authorized
by board action on January 25, 1956, to sign corporate
checks on the corporation's checking account in payment of corporate obligations. The corporate minutes
do not indicate that this authority was ever revoked
or questioned. He was thereby authorized to pay valid
corporate obligations without further board approval.
The payments to the Director of Internal Revenue for
corporate taxes at $3,241 and the payment of legal
services and commission on the sale of the Rim Group
by Smith & Nicholas law firm on Rocket's behalf in
the sum of $20,246.76 could not be and were not questioned. The obligation to Herman F. Lund and A. M.
Billis for a loan of funds to pay to the plaintiffs for
the acquisition of the mill and engineering studies
thereon in the amount of $48,330 were established by
competent testimony and the corporate records as were
the loans to the company by R. J. Gill and expenses
incurred in company business by him and A. M. Hillis.
The loans from Gill, Hillis and Lund were authorized
, and approved by the Board and reflected in the minutes,
ledger book and annual examination. The record conclusively proves that these obligations were proper corporate debts and therefore, needed no further board
approval before the payment of such debts could be
made.
31

There is one additional reason why appellants'
demand for the return of said $13,000 is not well taken.
The transactions entered into between the corporation
and R. J. Gill, Herman F. Lund and A.
Billis were
made in good faith and for the benefit of the corporation. Under those circumstances it matters little
whether or not those obligations were approved by a
distinterested quorum of the board of directors. The
law is clear that the corporation may not retain the
benefit and advantages of such a transaction and then
refuse to repay said obligations on the basis of some '
defect in the corporate procedure in approving them. '
In Geinsenburger & Friedler v. Robert York & Co.,
262 F. 739 (5th Cir. 1919), a mortgage was given by
a corporation to secure a loan made it by two directors.
The court held that the mortgage was not invalid because the two directors voted for their resolution and
their presence was necessary to constitute a quorum. 1
The court found that the contract was not unfair but
on the contrary, for the benefit of the corporation,
enabling it to settle its indebtedness on open accounts,
so that even though the interested directors voted for
the resolution, this would not be sufficient cause to
annul the mortgage.
1

1

Here there was no unfair advantage taken of
Rocket in the loans and advances to it by the respondents nor in the repayment of such valid debts. Thus
the presence of a disinterested quorum or lack thereof
cannot be used to require repayment of funds properly
owing which the corporation would immediately be
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obligated to pay back. There was no damage to the
corporation in satisfying these obligations. It had had
the benefit of such sums for an extended period of
time at no cost. The money or other consideration
received even if it had been through ultra vires contracts or invalid board action would have had to have
been returned by the corporation. This principle is
made clear in the decision of the Utah Supreme Court
in Baker v. Glenwood IJlining Co., 82 Utah 100, 21
P .2d 889 ( 1933) . There, this Court considered a case
involving two promissory notes of the defendant corpora ti on that had been given without board authorization to two directors of the corporation for loans made
the company. At 21 P.2d 892, this court said:
The rule made with respect to loans made by
officers of the corporation to the corporation,
and of the execution of negotiable paper thereon
by an officer without express authority from the
board of directors, is that such contracts are
not void but may be voidable at the option of
the corporation, and in proper cases by a stockholder or other person having rights or interests
adversely affected thereby. This rule was adopted to secure justice and not to work an injustice,
and where the contract is free from actual fraud
it cannot be avoided without restoration of the
money paid or value received by the corporation.
[Citing Niles v. United States Ozocerite, 113
P. 1038}
This court is committed to the doctrine that
where a corporation has received the benefits
of a contract, and while it still retains the fruits
thereof, it will be estopped from urging as a
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defense that the contract was ultra vires the
corporation or that the corporate officers were
without authority with respect thereto. (Citing
Millard County School Dist. v. State Bank, 14
P.2d 967; and Huntington A.M. and Mfg. Co.
v. Miller, 60 Utah 236, 208 P. 531.}
The court then concluded:
In view that the consideration for the notes was
received by the corporation, used by it for its
benefit ,and that it still retains the fruits of the
transaction, there being no claim of fraud or
unfair dealing or that the money was not honestly applied to the obligations of the corporation, it cannot be now heard to urge the defense
merely that the board of directors did not by
formal action or resolution authorize the execution of the notes. (Citing cases.}

1

The Baker v. Glenwood Mining Co. case is cited
with approval in 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations ,
§ 952, as authority for the proposition that
'
1

Where the president of a corporation loans
his money to the company, and the loan is free
from actual fraud, it has been held that the com·
pany cannot escape liability for the loan which
it has received and used, on the ground that the :
loan was made for the company by the president I
from himself without any action of the Board of
Directors.
1

Section 953 of Fletcher provides "where a director or
o'ther corporate officer pays valid existing debts of the .
corporation, he is ordinarily entitled to reimbursement." I
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l

The fact that the loans or advances were made by
corporate officers does not affect their validity unless
it cannot be shown that he acted in good faith and that
the corporation got the benefit of the act to the extent
charged. 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1298 (1965)
states:
A director or officer of a corporation may become a creditor of the corporation and as such
be entitled to the same remedies as other creditors. Although a corporate director or officer
is generally under no duty to use or to loan his
own funds to assist the corporation, he may loan
money to the corporation, and take a note therefor, and enforce its repayment, at least if the
transaction is open, fair, and free from fraud.
Since the record discloses no evidence of bad faith
or fraud on the part of the respondents in dealing with
the corporation and since the corporation clearly received the benefit of these transactions, the corporation
had the obligation to repay the sums loaned to it or
advanced for it by these men even if the particular
boards involved were not properly constituted or functioning. That is all that was done in the disbursement
, to them of part of the proceeds received from the sale
of the Rim Group.
Appellant, based only on invective and inuendo,
wants to hold all of the respondents personally responsible for these obligations despite the fact that R. J.
Gill was the only member of the board who authorized
such payments who received any direct benefit. 'Vhile
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R. J. Gill might have been held responsible for the
money that he personally received if appellants had
presented any competent evidence that payment to him
of these funds was a fraudulent appropriation of corporate funds, such evidence was not presented and
the facts established that he was entitled to receive this
money. The other directors would have had no responsibility even if the payment to him had been an improper application of funds. See 9 C.J.S. Corporations
§805 at 201 (1940) which states:
A director of a corporation who is not an officer,
and who did not draw salary or benefit by his
vote in favor of resolutions improperly appro·
pria ting money from the coarpora tion to other
directors is not liable for the refund thereof.
Because there was no evidence of any kind of impro·
priety or fraud in the payment of these corporate obli·
gations, there is no claim against any respondent,
including R. J. Gill.

CONCLUSION
Appellant acknowledges a lack of any proof of its
charges by lamely concluding that, in any event, be·
cause respondents were in fiduciary positions at various
times with Rocket Mining Company, the corporation
is entitled to an accounting from them of their handling
of corporate assets. It is respectfully submitted that
the minutes of the company, the corporate financial
records, and the uncontroverted testimony presented
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by the respondents fully accounted for all corporate

assets and sums owned, handled or received by the corporation during the time any of the respondents were
involved in the Rocket corporate affairs. This evidence
conclusively established that there was no improper
application of corporate funds or misuse of corporate
assets as contended without any evidentiary proof by
the appellant. The judgment of the trial could should,
therefore, be affirmed, respondents to recover their
costs.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID K. WATKISS
GLEN E. DAVIES
400 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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